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What kinds of media messages should we choose to receive, and how 
seriously should we take them? These questions are much more urgent now 
than they were in the pre-digital era, when we had far less control over the 
information we consumed. Back then, nearly all our media options came from 
the major TV networks, movie studios, book publishers, radio broadcasters 
and local news monopolies. Today, anyone can add to our inexhaustible menu 
of media choices, which continue to expand without pause. With so many 
choices at our fingertips, filtering becomes a top priority to arrive at any 
coherent understanding of the world beyond our direct experience. But what 
principles ought to drive our filtering and interpretive criteria? 
The standard answer to this question starts from the assumption that 
many of us don’t always make the best choices about what information to 
consume. As with food, what appeals to us most immediately is not always 
the healthiest or most useful — for example, soft news and infotainment 
are sometimes blamed for emphasizing the most salacious and least 
consequential aspects of public affairs. But even worse is factually untrue 
content designed to look authentic (what is sometimes called “fake news”), 
which usually targets those who agree with the false message. Extreme 
opinions can be equally harmful, as when they advocate for the systematic 
injury, oppression, or extermination of entire ethnicities, sexual orientations, 
or religious groups. I argue that, generally, people are well justified in 
avoiding such content.  
It’s easy to come up with examples of messages we do or don’t want to 
encounter. What has proven more difficult is specifying generalizable 
criteria for what makes a given piece of content worthy of our attention 
and consideration. One popular solution holds that we need to configure 
our filters to include messages “from the other side;” in other words, that 
lie outside our narrow domain of direct interest and opinion. In his recent 
book #Republic, Cass Sunstein advocates for media systems that give their 
audiences “unplanned” and “unwanted” experiences, apparently assuming 
that all exposure to other citizens’ opinions is inherently good. Clay Johnson, 
author of The Information Diet, cautions against consuming too much “mass 
affirmation” (i.e. content from sources we agree with), likening its mental 
effects to those of refined sugar on the body. And Eli Pariser, who gave us 
the now-household term “filter bubble,”1 points out that when services like 
Google and Amazon automatically show us what they think we want to see, 
they prevent us from seeing lots of potentially useful stuff. 
These insights give us a helpful start on our quest for better information 
filters, but they don’t go far enough. As a social scientist, I need to raise 
a slight empirical quibble with the notion that most people only consume 
content they agree with. Careful research has shown this to be incorrect, 
instead finding that while people prefer messages that support their 
1  If your household includes media professionals, that is.
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opinions, they do not systematically avoid disagreeable messages.2 So while 
media thinkers might wish for most media diets to be perfectly ideologically 
balanced at 50/50, the true balance is almost never 100 percent one-sided. 
But aside from that, I object more fundamentally to the notion that all mass 
affirmation (or “opinion congruency,” as scholars sometimes call it) is 
always bad, and its corollary that unwanted or unplanned encounters are 
always good. In true academic fashion, I will argue that it depends: each 
can sometimes be good and sometimes bad. This implies that we should not 
program our filters to use agreeableness as a primary decision rule, nor 
should we use it to determine whether to take messages seriously. 
I have an alternative suggestion for how to think about the kinds of 
information that are more and less worthy of our time. It involves not one 
conceptual dimension but three, which combine to create a filter map onto 
which we can project most of the messages we will encounter. The first is 
agreeableness, which captures the Sunsteinian/Johnsonian/Pariserian 
concept of aligning with our preexisting opinions. The second, truth value, is 
easy to define in principle but hard to apply in practice: it is simply whether a 
given message is true or false. To get a sense of how fraught this distinction 
can get, simply page back through some of public debates around the 
professional fact-checking industry from the past few years. The third axis 
I call legitimacy, and it is perhaps the most difficult to define of all.3 The term 
is borrowed from Daniel Hallin’s 1986 book The Uncensored War, in which 
he coins the phrase “sphere of legitimate controversy” to cover all opinions 
considered to be acceptable within a given society. In the United States, as in 
advanced democracies more generally, this usually reduces to an opinion’s 
adherence to widely accepted ethical norms like freedom, equality, fairness 
and human rights. While there is considerable debate around what kinds 
of opinions comport with such principles, it can be safely said that crimes 
like racial discrimination, torture and arbitrary detention definitively violate 
them. Legitimacy is solely a property of opinions, while truth value applies 
only to facts. Agreeableness cuts across both facts and opinions, as I’ll show 
a bit later. 
The filter map that emerges from the intersection of these three dimensions 
(Table 1) offers a simple guide to the kinds of information one should strive 
to consume and avoid. Ideally, our media filters would optimize for truth 
and legitimacy, ensuring that both agreeable and disagreeable content and 
sources are included (the map’s four blue cells). By the same token, false and 
illegitimate messages would be excluded, again regardless of agreeableness 
2  Freelon, Deen. “Personalized Information Environments and Their Potential Consequences for 
Disinformation.”; In Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem, 38–44. Philadelphia, PA: 
Annenberg School for Communication, 2017. https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
The-Disinformation-Ecosystem-20180207-v2.pdf#page=41
3 Altmire, Jason. “Inside the Meters: Guest Column: What to Do When Facts Don’t Tell the Entire Story.” 
Politifact, March 5, 2018. http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/blog/2018/mar/05/guest-column-
what-do-when-facts-dont-tell-entire-s/; Marx, Greg. “What the Fact-Checkers Get Wrong.” Columbia 
Journalism Review, January 5, 2012. https://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/what_the_fact-checkers_get_
wro.php; Smith, David. “The Lost Cause of American Political Fact-Checkers.” The Conversation, September 
16, 2012. http://theconversation.com/the-lost-cause-of-american-political-fact-checkers-9534.
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(the four white cells). The conceptual leap I make here is from considering 
disagreeableness as a virtue in itself, as the previously mentioned authors 
have done, to distinguishing between more and less desirable types of 
disagreeable content. There are many claims and opinions we should 
rightly dismiss out of hand, but there are others we should entertain despite 
disagreeing with them. This essay explains why I think filtering information 
this way is beneficial, illustrating key points primarily by example. I first 
discuss agreeableness in detail, next proceeding to truth value and then 
legitimacy, covering all eight of the filter map’s cells along the way.
TABLE 1: THE FILTER MAP
AGREEABLE DISAGREEABLE
CLAIMS OF 
FACT
True Facts that support your case Inconvenient truths
False Comforting lies Libel/slander
OPINIONS
Legitimate Opinions you agree with and are 
compatible with broadly shared values
Opinions you disagree with but are 
compatible with broadly shared values
Illegitimate
Opinions you agree with and are 
incompatible with broadly shared 
values (e.g. your prejudices)
Opinions you disagree with and are 
incompatible with broadly shared values 
(e.g. other people’s prejudices that affect 
you)
Agreeableness 
We all have opinions, and most people don’t particularly enjoy having them 
threatened or belittled. In the pre-digital era, most people formed most of 
their political opinions based on content produced by a small collection of 
tightly-controlled media outlets. Today, our opinions can be informed by 
nearly any perspective imaginable. Given this situation, it is little wonder 
that many tend toward news and information that consistently flatters their 
preexisting opinions. Such “hyperpartisan” content mostly reaches the 
politically engaged, while apolitical citizens usually try to filter politics out 
of their personalized information streams as much as possible. Either way, 
people generally seek content that fits their interests, which often means 
opting into information streams that are low on disagreeableness.
Of course, this isn’t inherently bad; on the contrary, it’s a straightforward 
consequence of using filters to perceive our way through a media-saturated 
world. But our filters aren’t perfect, and most of us end up encountering 
disagreeable content on a fairly regular basis. When something gets through 
that we disagree with, we have two basic choices for how to proceed. We can 
shoo it away as quickly as possible, as we might an errant housefly; or we can 
sit with it awhile, consider its strengths and weaknesses, and perhaps even 
allow it to shift our thinking, if only a little. But the bare fact that a message 
conflicts with our opinions is not enough information to decide which of those 
paths to take.
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A better way of doing so involves knowing whether a message is a claim 
of fact or an opinion. To refer to something as a “claim of fact” is to assert 
that it is falsifiable, meaning capable of being proven true or false. The 
statements “the earth is round” and “the earth is flat” are both falsifiable, but 
of course one is true while the other is false. In contrast, the statement “the 
earth is beautiful” is not falsifiable because it expresses an opinion and is 
therefore not subject to empirical verification. In the simplest analysis, fact 
claims are either true or false, although fact-checkers like PolitiFact have 
introduced graded spectra of truthfulness to capture the slippery ambiguity 
of contemporary political speech. The analogous categories for opinions are 
legitimate and illegitimate, which I’ll explain at greater length later.
Truth value
I want to cover truth value first because it’s more familiar and therefore 
easier to grasp than legitimacy. Epistemologists have debated the question 
of what exactly constitutes truth since the time of Socrates, but that’s not 
our present concern. All that’s required to proceed is a fundamental faith 
in empiricism, the ability to determine what is and isn’t true by observing 
the world. If we can assume that’s theoretically possible for all fact claims, 
and practical for many important ones, we can start to consider what kinds 
of claims we want to encounter and taking seriously. The answer here is 
deceptively simple: we should embrace truth and reject falsehood. Yet in 
practice this turns out to be much more difficult than it appears.
One of the most powerful causes of this difficulty is the agreeableness 
dimension. This is because it’s much easier to decide whether a message 
is agreeable than whether it is true. Indeed, it’s so much easier that some 
people, including the current U.S. president, have succumbed to the 
temptation to erase all distinctions between the two. According to such 
individuals, what is agreeable is true, and what is disagreeable is false — this 
is how “fake news” comes to mean “messages that contradict my preferred 
fact claims.” Only agreeable fact claims matter, this perspective dictates, and 
everything else can be dismissed with the freshly-redefined label of “fake.” 
The Oxford English Dictionary saw fit to recognize this epistemological 
chimera with its 2016 Word of the Year, “post-truth.”
I’ll give the post-truthers this much: agreeable facts are fine, so long as 
they are, in fact, facts. As much as I wish this went without saying, I’ll say it 
again: what should matter is true vs. false, not agreeable vs. disagreeable, 
because falsehoods outside of fictional contexts are generally bad. Using 
agreeableness as a primary information filter causes two kinds of problems 
specific to fact claims: first, it increases users’ vulnerability to seductive 
falsehoods; and second, it lowers the likelihood that users will encounter true 
but disagreeable messages. Lies designed to look true are the other kind of 
fake news, and American pranksters, Macedonian teenagers, and Russian 
propagandists (among others) have been known to spread them. One of the 
most effective techniques to boost uptake of false messages is to appeal to a 
political faction’s core beliefs. For example, “Pope Francis Endorses Trump” 
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gained currency among the right in 2016, while “Florida School Shooter Tied 
to White Nationalist Group” appealed more to the left in early 2018. Given that 
confirmation bias predicts we will accept agreeable claims less critically, 
we should be vigilant about rejecting them emphatically whenever they are 
debunked.   
But congenial falsehoods are not the only hazard awaiting those with a 
distaste for disagreeableness. They will also miss inconvenient truths, and 
while that may keep one’s ego safe, it’s a dangerous way to build a worldview. 
To put it lightly, ignoring potentially important facts may result in extremely 
flawed decisions. Adherents of the flat earth conspiracy theory have failed 
to incorporate the abundant evidence of our planet’s spherical shape into 
their cosmology (although they accuse everyone else of doing the same with 
their preferred “evidence”). Somewhat more seriously, if Edgar Welch had 
paid more attention to the empirical doubts raised about a possible child sex 
ring housed underneath the Comet Ping Pong restaurant in Washington, 
D.C., he might not have fired a gun on the premises while trying to liberate 
its nonexistent victims. These examples and countless others stem from an 
unwillingness to perceive or engage with valid yet opinion-threatening facts. 
It is a tendency we should endeavor to eliminate.
The final category to consider in our truth-value quartet is disagreeable 
falsehoods. These are lies whose danger to ourselves and our belief systems 
allows us to identify them quickly and conclusively. As such, few of us have 
difficulty addressing them appropriately. Most fit the conceptual, if not the 
legal, definition of libel or slander, such as allegations that President Obama 
was born in Kenya (birtherism), or that members of the Bush administration 
had advance knowledge of or helped plan the 9/11 attacks (9/11 trutherism). 
When lies like these threaten our opinions, we typically waste little time 
dismissing or debunking them, as we should.
Legitimacy
Having completed our analysis of desirable and undesirable fact claims, let 
us now turn to the domain of opinion. Because opinions can’t be definitively 
judged based on empirical evidence, we must use alternative criteria to 
decide which to allow and deny our attention. Truth value is the only valid 
criterion for assessing fact claims4, and the only widely-accepted equivalent 
for opinions is culturally-specific consensus. I capture this notion with the 
term “legitimacy.” In the West, legitimate opinions generally align with moral 
principles that are enshrined across a broad array of societies, governments, 
philosophies, and religions. Examples include freedom, justice, equality, 
fairness, universal human rights, due process, and non-maleficence (“do no 
harm”). While it may seem that some of these terms have been overused to 
the point of meaninglessness, I argue that they form a meaningful bulwark 
4  This position is not universal; see for example Owens, Patricia. “Beyond Strauss, Lies, and the War 
in Iraq: Hannah Arendt’s Critique of Neoconservatism.” Review of International Studies 33, no. 2 (2007): 
265–283, p. 266.
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against many of humanity’s worst impulses. For example, it would be difficult 
to argue that practices such as  torture, arbitrary detention, theft, collective 
punishment, ethnic persecution, and sexual assault are “legitimate” under 
most widely-subscribed moral codes. Yet there are active schools of thought 
today that openly advocate for each of these.5  
Under most circumstances, such opinions do not warrant serious 
consideration, or even attention. This is not because they are disagreeable, 
but rather because they are illegitimate. The distinction between the 
two is subtle but useful, and thus worth explaining. Agreeableness is a 
fundamentally subjective characteristic; what is agreeable to me may or may 
not be to you. In contrast, legitimacy is intersubjective, deriving its status as 
such from moral values shared across governments, cultures, religions, and 
philosophies. It is not universal (if the internet has taught us anything, it’s that 
nothing is), but its components are officially recognized by enough individuals 
and institutions to recommend its use as an opinion filtering criterion.    
This means that opinions can simultaneously be agreeable and illegitimate. 
Bigotries fit this category, whether held against a specific ethnicity, gender 
identity, religion, economic class, disability status, etc. When held by the 
individual doing the content filtering, such prejudices are agreeable in the 
same sense as any other political opinion from their perspective. But they 
are intersubjectively illegitimate, which is why most bigots deny their bigotry 
even when confronted with undeniable evidence thereof. Recently we have 
begun to see shameless advocacy for prejudicial views in the mainstream 
media, with two recent examples involving questioning the personhood of 
Jews and denying the franchise to women.6 As illegitimate opinions, our 
framework would recommend they be dismissed out of hand for flouting 
the notions of human rights and equality that most Western citizens take for 
granted. Individuals holding such opinions should seriously reconsider them 
in light of the great harm they continue to cause.
Moving diagonally across the map, let’s next consider disagreeable yet 
legitimate views. These are opinions one disagrees with but that still lie 
within Hallin’s sphere of legitimate controversy. To reiterate, this is the set 
of political opinions within a society that may conflict but are considered 
reasonable to hold, and that the press and other major institutions thus 
take seriously. To categorize an opinion as disagreeable and legitimate is 
to acknowledge its political validity in spite of your personal rejection of it. 
You can see its merits (or at least understand people’s reasons for holding 
5  This excludes arguments that such practices are something other than what they are widely 
considered to be, e.g. denials that waterboarding is torture. See Greenwood, Max. “Trump: Waterboarding 
Isn’t Torture.” Text. TheHill, January 26, 2017. http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/316435-trump-
waterboarding-isnt-torture.
 
6 Hayden, Michael Edison. “‘Alt-Right’ Leader Richard Spencer Isn’t Sure If Women Should Be Allowed to 
Vote.” Newsweek, October 14, 2017. http://www.newsweek.com/alt-right-leader-richard-spencer-isnt-
sure-if-women-should-be-allowed-vote-685048; Nickalls, Sammy. “‘Are Jews People’ Was an Actual, Real 
Discussion Topic on CNN.” Esquire, November 22, 2016. https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/
a50906/are-jews-people-was-a-real/.
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it), debate it in good faith, and perhaps even consider subscribing to it. 
In contrast, illegitimate opinions occupy what Hallin calls the “sphere of 
deviance,” which is reserved for ideas so diametrically opposed to the shared 
values I outline above that to even entertain them would cause intolerable 
harm. This is why we shouldn’t have serious national conversations about 
whether Jews are people or whether women ought to be able to vote. 
The remaining two categories, agreeable/legitimate and disagreeable/
illegitimate, are fairly straightforward. In most cases, our instincts will 
direct us to accept the former and reject the latter, as we should. Legitimate 
opinions are much easier to embrace when we also agree with them, and we 
are just as quick to condemn illegitimate opinions we disagree with.   
I hope the above discussion amply demonstrates that, similarly to truth value, 
an optimal opinion filtering criterion would include both types of legitimate 
opinions while excluding both types of illegitimate ones. Legitimate dissent is 
essential to democratic practice in pluralistic societies — we can’t simply wall 
ourselves off from every opinion we disagree with, if only because some of 
those opinions will inevitably shape public policy. So we need to decide which 
of all the opinions we don’t hold that we will respect and which we will not, 
because not all opinions deserve respect. I believe the concept of legitimacy, 
imperfect as it is, offers a useful guide for making such distinctions.
Implementation and limitations
In this concluding section I will address the question of how the filter 
map might be implemented, as well as some potential objections to its key 
components. Developing this framework has been an engaging intellectual 
exercise, but if it can’t be applied effectively in practice, it will have been 
strictly an academic one. But several existing initiatives demonstrate 
functionality that points the way toward what I’ve proposed. Most social 
media platforms are built to maximize the agreeableness of the content 
the user sees, so most of those features would need to be discarded at the 
outset. We are looking to build a system that delivers true and legitimate 
content from across our personal agreement spectrum.
In some ways, this desired result resembles the content of a national 
daily newspaper or newscast — what Sunstein called a “general interest 
intermediary.” But our ideal system would improve upon the well-known 
legacy news outlets in several ways. First, it would offer a much wider range 
of content than what has traditionally been considered “newsworthy” by 
drawing on the value judgments of more than just news editors about what is 
worth sharing. This is extremely important given the longstanding problems 
with institutional inclusion in journalism — whenever news judgments 
come from a largely homogeneous group, certain topics will inevitably be 
underrepresented. Relatedly, some of the most deeply-ingrained journalistic 
practices require the inclusion of content that lies outside the filter map’s 
blue cells. When reporters insist on presenting views from “both sides” of 
certain issues, falsehoods are sometimes presented as equivalent to truth. 
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This used to be common in discussions of climate change, where climate 
deniers were presented on equal footing with the scientific consensus, 
although that has changed for the better recently. The desire to appear 
objective has also left news outlets poorly equipped to handle situations 
where one side lies disproportionately more often than the other. A filtering 
system that does not claim objectivity would not have this problem: all 
messages that meet our blue criteria would be admitted. Instead, it would 
seek a different kind of balance — that between agreeable and disagreeable 
blue content. 
Most people agree that truth is better than falsehood, but distinguishing 
between the two seems to get more difficult by the day. If my social media 
feeds allowed me to reliably filter out all false content, I’d flip those switches 
right now. In the absence of such a magic bullet, how else might we cope with 
all the fakery out there? No single approach will solve the problem by itself, 
but multiple technical and individual interventions can move us forward from 
where we are. I am encouraged by Facebook’s practice of attaching “related 
articles” to content that has been flagged by third-party fact-checking 
organizations as false. This feature results in far lower rates of false content 
sharing than an earlier one that added large “Disputed” badges to such 
content.7 Google has increased efforts to remove misleading content from 
its search results by demoting the sites that carry it in search results8 and 
preventing them from masking their countries of origin.9 Browser extensions 
like Newscracker and FactoidL10 attempt to project a similar logic onto the 
entire web, and although they currently suffer from substantial flaws, future 
versions might work well enough for daily general use. 
Stamping out flagrant falsehoods is hard enough, but what about messages 
from that gray area in the middle of the truth value spectrum? Most content 
doesn’t come in the form of neatly true or false statements like the ones from 
epistemology textbooks — many are embedded in complex messages that 
can’t easily be labeled one way or the other. An illustrative case in point is 
PolitiFact’s 2011 Lie of the Year, which was widely criticized by commentators 
on the left. That year, the organization bestowed the dubious distinction 
on Democratic politicians’ claims that Republicans had voted to “end” or 
“terminate” Medicare. PolitiFact described what the GOP had actually done 
thus: “The plan kept Medicare intact for people 55 or older, but dramatically 
changed the program for everyone else by privatizing it and providing 
7  Shu, Catherine. “Facebook Will Ditch Disputed Flags on Fake News and Display Links to Trustworthy 
Articles Instead.” TechCrunch (blog), December 21, 2017. http://social.techcrunch.com/2017/12/20/
facebook-will-ditch-disputed-flags-on-fake-news-and-display-links-to-trustworthy-articles-instead/. 
8  Krishna, Swapna. “Google Takes Steps to Combat Fake News ‘Snippets.’” Engadget, January 31, 2018. 
https://www.engadget.com/2018/01/31/google-tackles-fake-news-in-snippets/. 
9  Wong, Raymond. “Google’s Taking Another Big Step to Stop the Spread of Fake News.” Mashable, 
December 17, 2017. https://mashable.com/2017/12/17/google-news-no-hiding-country-origin-stop-fake-
news/.   
10  McCarthy, Bill. “Fact-Checking Browser Extensions: Analyzing NewsCracker and FactoidL.” Duke 
Reporters’ Lab, February 23, 2018. https://reporterslab.org/fact-checking-browser-extensions-
newscracker-factoidl/. 
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government subsidies.”11 Liberals sharply criticized PolitiFact’s decision to 
label their description of this move as a “lie,” let alone the most egregious 
of the year.12 The validity of that judgment turns on whether you believe 
changing Medicare into a different program with the same name (which 
PolitiFact acknowledged the GOP vote tried to do) constitutes “ending” it. This 
example illustrates that calling out falsehoods isn’t always easy, even for the 
experts. In such cases, a good filter map would include both perspectives so 
that users could make up their own minds.
As difficult as the domain of truth value can be sometimes, legitimacy is even 
more fraught. The shared values that are supposed to bound legitimate 
opinions are slippery and vague. Fortunately, there are many areas of moral 
consensus in our society, e.g. that slavery, murder, torture, rape, political 
violence, and other serious crimes should not be openly defended. Indeed, 
we rarely see straightforward advocacy of such crimes: we more often 
encounter attempts to re-categorize them as virtues or necessities. This is 
how waterboarding comes to be defined not as torture but as “enhanced 
interrogation,” and open racism rebrands itself from the shaved heads 
and combat boots of neo-Nazism to the suits and ties of the “alt-right.” 
News outlets’ editorial practices offer a model for rejecting such subtle 
infiltrations. There’s a reason NBC never hosts Islamic State members on 
Meet the Press, and it’s the same reason the Associated Press’ guidelines 
direct its reporters to identify the alt-right as the white supremacists they 
are.13 News outlets should obviously report on illegitimate beliefs when 
circumstances warrant; for example, when influential people proclaim them. 
But their stories should take pains to unambiguously separate such beliefs 
from those that deserve evenhanded coverage. Clearly-stated policies on 
how to handle known illegitimate philosophies can assist citizens as they go 
about deciding how seriously to take them.    
Unfortunately, not all opinions are as clear cut. Nearly everyone claims to 
be in favor of freedom, justice, equality, human rights, etc., but a host of 
contradictory opinions come labeled with those terms. Some claim that 
abortion is a human right, while others consider it morally equivalent to 
slavery. Affirmative action has been called both an essential corrective to 
historical discrimination and an unacceptable infringement of racial and 
gender equality. Contested policies like these have no definitive solutions 
and can only be resolved within predefined ideological frameworks. Users 
might look to see what trusted and respected organizations such as  the 
Southern Poverty Law Center, the Anti-Defamation League, and the NAACP 
have said about controversial opinions and movements. Blocking specific 
11  Adair, Bill, and Angie Drobnic Holan. “Lie of the Year 2011: ‘Republicans Voted to End Medicare.’” 
PolitiFact, December 20, 2011. http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2011/dec/20/lie-year-
democrats-claims-republicans-voted-end-me/. 
12  E.g. Linkins, Jason. “Politifact Has Decided That A Totally True Thing Is The ‘Lie Of The Year,’ For Some 
Reason.” Huffington Post, December 20, 2011, sec; Media. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/20/
politifact-lie-of-the-year_n_1160576.html.
13  Daniszewski, John. “Writing about the ‘Alt-Right.’” AP Definitive Source, November 28, 2016. https://
blog.ap.org/behind-the-news/writing-about-the-alt-right. 
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individuals and outlets might prevent some illegitimate opinions from being 
displayed, but others will inevitably seep through. Users will need to interpret 
these individually based on their own individual senses of what is and is not 
legitimate.
The purpose of this essay has been to propose a rough but useful heuristic 
for deciding what kinds of messages we should want to encounter in our 
everyday mediated lives. It is not possible in this short space to address all 
possible objections, or to fully explain how it all might be implemented on a 
technical level. I leave those tasks to anyone who has been inspired to build 
on the ideas presented here. In closing, it’s important to remember that 
everything we accept as true or legitimate today is subject to change down 
the road. Therefore, it will sometimes be necessary to repudiate previously 
accepted messages that turn out to be false or illegitimate. It is this habit, 
more than any technical solution, that will bring us closer to the truth and 
rectitude most of us claim to want.
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